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1 Introduction: start-up incentives as an active labour market 
measure 
Generally, there are three different types of start-up incentive for unemployed and inactive 
people in the Netherlands. The first is a set of incentives for potential entrepreneurs 
receiving Unemployment Benefits (UB) (Werloosheidwet - WW). Such incentives have 
existed since 2006 and were adjusted in 2013. Second, as of 2004 there are specific 
incentives for people who receive social assistance (Wet werk en inkomen - WWB). Third, 
there are incentives for people who are ill or who have a work disability and receive benefits 
related to their work incapacity (Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen – WIA for 
work disability; Ziektewet for illness; or Wajong for young disabled). These incentives are 
all aimed at stimulating unemployed people to leave benefits by starting-up a business. 
They also appear to be cost-effective, as often the incentive consists of guidance for the 
new entrepreneur and the temporary abolishment of the obligation to apply for a job. 
Between September 2007 and September 2008, Statistics Netherlands observed that 23 
800 people left social support by starting their own businesses. Of those 23 800 people, 
14 100 used to receive UB, 5 600 used to be welfare recipients, and 4 100 received support 
for having a work disability. One period later, September 2008 to September 2009, 11 200 
people left UB, 4 300 left welfare, and 3 600 left disability or sickness benefits. Another 
period later, September 2009 to September 2010, shows that 17 300, 4 400, and 3 300 
people stopped receiving unemployment, welfare, and disability or illness benefits, because 
they had started their own business. That means that by starting a company, 25 000 
people left government support in recent years (Statistics Netherlands/CBS 2013; online 
Statline database).  
Table 1: Outflow out of various social security schemes into self-employment 
 Outflow out of...  
 Sickness or 
work disability 
UB Welfare 
28 September, 2007 to 
26 September, 2008 
4 100 14 100 5 600 
26 September, 2008 to 
25 September, 2009 
3 600 11 200 4 300 
25 September, 2009 to 
24 September, 2010 
3 300 17 300 4 400 
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
The following section will discuss the influence of the different start-up incentive policies 
on the above-mentioned trend. 
2 Start-up incentives today: detailed description  
Start-up incentive for UB recipients 
The target group encompasses all UB recipients who choose to start-up their own 
business. UB recipients can make this choice by their own initiative or after a suggestion 
by a coach of the Dutch PES. However, as the PES’ objective is to provide the UB recipient 
with a sustainable source of (non-UB) income, there is some restraint in suggesting the 
possibility to start-up one’s own company since returning to employment remains the 
quickest way out of unemployment. Only if finding a job proves difficult will the UB recipient 
be suggested the possibility of starting a company of his/her own. (SEO 2009, p.11, 61).  
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The start-up incentive for UB recipients is a permanent incentive that has been 
implemented as of 2006 and was changed slightly in 2013. Its duration is 26 weeks, which 
was before 2013 a maximum duration and after 2013 the standard duration (see 
documents second chamber of parliament, 2012). The amount of support depends on 
the level of the UB an individual receives. The main deal is that while starting-up a company 
UB income is decreased, meaning that the support is relatively cost neutral. The start-up 
incentive gives the future entrepreneur two options as to how working hours are dealt with 
vis-à-vis their benefits. They can choose to be treated as UB recipients who become 
employed, meaning that the number of working hours are deducted from the UB benefit 
(based on the usual system of calculating hours). If someone starts working full-time, the 
UB ends. Accordingly, this is valid for someone who becomes an entrepreneur on a fulltime 
basis. Yet, as of 2006 future entrepreneurs may also opt for using the starter arrangement 
(startersregeling). Until 2013 this gave the UB recipient a maximum time period of 26 
weeks to start-up their own company. During these weeks the UB recipient kept his or her 
UB entitlement and moreover was freed from the obligation to actively apply for jobs.  
After the full profit/revenues had been calculated, 70 % of this profit was settled with the 
amount of UB received. As such, the UB was seen as a payment in advance during these 
26 weeks. This changed as of 1 January 2013 when the 26 weeks period became 
mandatory on starting up a business. Moreover, following an evaluation which highlighted 
some obstacles for users of the starter arrangement, the level of the UB benefit was 
reduced by a fixed percentage of 29 % during these 26 weeks (Article 35ab Act UB 
(Werkloosheidswet). This means that no settlement has to take place after establishing 
the level of profits. This percentage is the same for everyone, irrespective of hours spent 
on the business or profit gained. It means that for UB recipients with a low level of business 
revenues, the new arrangement is less advantageous in terms of total income (UB + profit) 
than it was before 2013. However, for those who gain a lot of income from their new 
company, the arrangement is advantageous compared to the one before 2013. 
The conditions for using the starter arrangement include a rule to prevent that the 
arrangement is being used for supporting bogus self-employment. The choice for using 
the starter arrangement needs to be approved by the Dutch PES (UWV). If the UB recipient 
has been working for the government or in the education sector prior to receiving benefits, 
then he/she does not have a PES advisor. In that case the (ex-) employer or the re-
integration company should approve the plans for a start-up and give PES advice on this. 
PES will then make a decision on granting the starter arrangement based on this advice 
(UWV, 2013). PES will grant the starter arrangement if there is a high chance that the new 
business will generate enough revenues to provide a living. The starter arrangement will 
be denied if within the time period of 26 weeks the entrepreneur does an assignment for 
his or her ex-employer. This is in order to prevent abuse (UWV, 2013). This criteria, in 
combination with the other conditions for admittance to the starter arrangement, limit the 
risk of fraud and abuse. A reported drawback of these conditions for admission is that the 
starters experience complexity (SEO 2009, p.65). The complexity of the arrangements 
between 2006 and 2013 could be one of the explanations for the alleged 'fraud' detected. 
The National Ombudsman concluded in 2010 that the work coaches of PES have not always 
given the correct information and correct advice to new entrepreneurs, and that brochures 
were incomplete. This concerned especially the calculation of indirect working hours for the 
business (e.g. acquisition) and the impact of these indirect hours in the calculation of the 
level of benefits and its settlement with hours spent working for their own company. It has 
led to relatively many cases of entrepreneurs having to pay back parts of the UB they 
received in the start-up phase. This could be labeled as fraud, yet could also be a 
consequence of difficult rules or contradicting advice. 
The conditions further reveal the interaction with the UB policies, showing that UB 
serves as a source of income security for new entrepreneurs, at least for some time. After 
the 26 weeks of starting-up a company, several scenarios may occur. If the UB recipient 
decides to become a full-time entrepreneur, the UB stops. If the decision is to become a 
part-time entrepreneur, UB is decreased by the number of hours spent on the business. 
These hours include direct as well as indirect business hours, the latter being time spent 
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on administration, acquisition or training. For the remaining hours, the part-time 
entrepreneur may receive UB. Yet, he/she is then also obliged to apply for a job covering 
these remaining hours. In addition, the revenues should be accounted for every week 
(UWV, 2013). If the UB recipient decides to end his/her company, then UB will continue, if 
there are still UB entitlements. In this case there is again a duty to apply for a job. A last 
scenario is that the business fails to be successful. If a person has been a full-time 
entrepreneur and has left UB entirely, he/she may have UB entitlements still. Yet, this may 
only be the case if the business has ended entirely within the time period that the UB 
entitlements were still valid. 
The changes in the arrangement in 2013 also introduced a slight change of 
complementary services, giving support to future entrepreneurs, but also installing a 
mechanism to single out the most promising entrepreneurs to flow into the arrangement. 
It involves a six week period to examine whether starting-up a business would indeed 
match the preferences and capacities of the potential entrepreneur and whether the 
business is likely to be successful. Within this period the following steps are taken. First, 
the UB recipients should discuss his or her entrepreneurial plans with a PES expert. The 
explorative period of six weeks allows the potential entrepreneur to investigate his or her 
capabilities, the idea of a start-up (e.g. feasibility, finances, location, insurances, licenses), 
to get information from tax agencies about having a business, to get information from the 
chamber of commerce, and to set up a business plan. The potential entrepreneur should 
discuss with PES whether the plans are indeed feasible. At the end of the six week period 
the decision should be taken whether or not to become an entrepreneur (see also Article 
77a Act UB). During this period the UB recipient does not have to apply for jobs and keeps 
the entire UB entitlements (UWV, 2013). 
Regarding the amount of public resources mobilised, financing methods and sources 
the government expects that the new arrangement, deducting 29 % from UB for all future 
entrepreneurs, will lead to an expenditure reduction of EUR 1 million as a result of better 
implementation. This is due to the fact that the tax agency and PES no longer need to 
settle the entrepreneurial profits with the UB received (Documents second chamber of 
parliament, 2012). Moreover, the expectation is that the overall public expenditure on UB 
is not affected by the new arrangement, as the 29 % figure is based on the average use 
of the starter grant prior to 2013. In addition, the government expects that administrative 
costs for citizens and companies will decrease. New entrepreneurs no longer have to give 
information about their profits to PES and do not have to make an estimation about their 
expected revenues. Also, there is no settlement after the start-up period. On average, the 
administrative burden for new entrepreneurs will decrease by 14 minutes. Overall public 
expenditure on start-up incentives is relatively hard to establish. By reducing their UB, 
future entrepreneurs finance themselves for exploring start-up options. Probably for this 
reason, an Ecorys/IZA study (2012, p. 280) does not give information regarding the 
Netherlands on expenditures on start-up subsidies as a percentage of GDP. Yet, PES does 
contribute to the start-up incentives by providing coaching activities to people who are in 
the orientation or exploratory phase of entrepreneurship. It is likely that such expenditure 
is added to the general expenditure of supporting activities (e.g. in the Ecorys/IZA report 
on p. 280 this may fall under the heading ‘training’ or ‘supported employment 
rehabilitation’ which amounted to 0.1 % and 0.5 % of GDP respectively in 2009). SEO 
(2009) mentions that the implementation costs increased after 2006, due to the additional 
efforts of PES to coach starters. 
The Monitoring and evaluation system. In 2009, an evaluation of the start-up incentive 
for UB recipients was carried out at the request of the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour (SEO, 2009). In this evaluation, UB recipients that started a company were divided 
into three groups: (1) recipients that started before 1 July 2006 (and could only opt for 
the system of calculating hours), (2) recipients that started after 1 July 2006 and chose 
the traditional system of calculating hours, and (3) recipients that started after 1 July 2006 
and chose for the new starter arrangement. The evaluation analysed data from the PES 
database, results of a survey of the three groups of starters, and interviews with PES staff. 
The evaluation came to the following conclusions.  
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i. First of all, from 2005 and 2006 (11 000) to 2007 (13 000) and 2008 (12 000), the 
number of starters increased. Of this increase, 50 % - 75 % can be attributed to 
the introduction of the starter arrangement. Of the users of the starter 
arrangement, 10 % (19 %) indicated that they certainly (probably) would not have 
started a company without having had the option to use the starter arrangement.  
ii. Second, both groups that started after 1 July 2006 had similar characteristics with 
the exception of daily wages. On average, users of the starter arrangement had 
higher daily wages, meaning that they had higher income before they became 
unemployed. This indicates that, in general, people that have the capacity of 
generating higher earnings favour the starter arrangement, possibly because they 
have more to lose when opting for the traditional system.  
iii. The third finding is that the companies of starters in both groups have the same 
chance of survival (88 %). Moreover, after two years, only small differences remain 
when it comes to the time invested, and earnings and profits generated.  
iv. Fourth, despite the fact that finding employment is the PES’ primary goal, it does 
provide more guidance to the groups that started after 1 July 2006. Both groups 
are more satisfied with this guidance than the group that started before this date. 
However, a common complaint (41 %) is that the method of settling profits with 
UB receipts is unclear to starters. With regards to returning to UB, starters using 
the starter arrangement are less likely to reapply for UB than are starters using the 
system of calculating hours (after 1 July 2006) (SEO, 2009).  
v. Finally, in terms of costs to the government, the total UB premiums paid did not 
show a noteworthy increase or decrease. The implementation costs did increase, 
however, which is due to the additional efforts by PES on guiding the starters (SEO 
2009).  
This evaluation was the reason for a change to the starter arrangement in 2013 (see above) 
aiming to make the arrangement less complex from 2013, and decrease benefits by 29 % 
for all UB recipients who are going through the 26 weeks start-up phase. Moreover, the 
current arrangement includes the rule that if the new arrangements result in a lower take-
up then the 29 % figure may be lowered by a general measure of government (Algemene 
maatregel van bestuur; see Article 35ab Act UB) (see also letter of Minister on proposed 
changes in UB starter arrangement1, 1 July 2011). In its annual report for 2013, PES 
reported that in 2013 11 000 UB recipients made use of the new starter arrangement. At 
the end of 2013, almost 5 000 of them did not yet meet the end of the 26 weeks period. 
However, 6 100 went through the entire period, and of those people, 4 400 have flowed 
out of UB entirely, 3 300 of which as an entrepreneur. 1 700 people who have gone through 
the entire 26 weeks period are still receiving UB, yet, 600 of these are part-time 
entrepreneurs (UWV, 2014). Although the starter arrangement has been evaluated in 
rather positive terms, and it adds an additional 1 000 to 1 500 people starting businesses 
per annum, the outflow out of UB is much lower for people who are developing their own 
business than for other UB recipients. One reason is that new entrepreneurs have relatively 
secure income from UB and can take their time to develop a company. Another reason 
might be that only people who have a lower chance of flowing into regular employment 
opt for becoming an entrepreneur (SEO, 2009). 
Start-up incentives for people with a work-disability or illness 
The target group for this incentive to start-up a business is all people who have a work-
disability or who are ill. In order to get some counselling/support from PES, one does not 
necessarily need to receive a benefit. The incentive is permanent. Those who receive 
either a disability benefit (WIA) or a sickness benefit (Ziektewet), may discuss their plans 
                                           
1 Internet: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/zelfstandigen-zonder-personeel-
zzp/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2011/07/01/startersregeling-ww.html 
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for a start-up with their PES labour counsellor. In such a conversation an agreement may 
be made to stop the requirement to apply for jobs for a period in order to prepare for a 
start-up (UWV, 2013). Yet, being registered at PES is mandatory during this period. If the 
potential entrepreneur gets a job offer, he/she and the labour counsellor jointly decide 
what is best: to take on the job or to continue setting up a business. If after the orientation 
phase the decision is taken to start a company, the revenues from the company are settled 
with the level of the benefit. The decision could be to lower the benefits on a more 
permanent basis, so as to prevent the entrepreneur needing to pay back larger amounts 
of money if profits are high. Yet, should the benefit recipient not be fit enough to continue 
his/her business, then he/she is entitled to the old level of benefits. There is no need to 
keep track of hours spent on a business (at least not for PES), as PES only looks at the 
revenues/income. Yet, if the entrepreneur wants to make use of additional arrangements, 
such as the tax facility allowing entrepreneurs to deduct certain amounts from their profit 
(e.g. the entrepreneur tax deduction ondernemersaftrek), keeping track of working hours 
is mandatory for the tax agency, including hours spend on administration, training and 
acquisition. 
In order to provide some income security there is in certain cases the option to get a 
temporary income supplement (inkomenssuppletie). This entitlement is valid for people 
who receive disability benefits (WAO, WAZ or WAJONG) and who earn via their own 
company less than the prospective income estimated by the labour expert of PES. The 
income supplement may run for four years, starting with a maximum of 20 % of what the 
labour expert of PES estimated as prospective income. This supplement is then gradually 
decreased over a period of four years (see e.g. Articles 65c and 65d Act disability insurance 
in the chapter II b on re-integration instruments) (Wet 
arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering). This income supplement is not available for people 
who fall within the scope of the Sickness Act (Ziektewet) or the new disability benefit Act 
(WIA) (UWV, 2013).  
People who do not receive a benefit via PES, yet who are ill or have a work disability, may 
nevertheless get some support from PES while setting up their own enterprise. This 
involves the target groups of people who receive welfare or people who do not receive 
income support at all. The condition is that he/she should reside in the Netherlands (UWV, 
2013). Moreover, PES should judge that this person has an illness or handicap that justifies 
the type of support that is requested. Support can encompass a wide range of services and 
equipment, such as making adjustments to the work space, intermediary activities for deaf 
or blind people (e.g. interpreters for deaf people or help with ready texts aloud), transport 
to work (e.g. taxi or adjustments to a car), a lift in the office/building or facilities for making 
a building accessible to wheelchairs, and coaching for entrepreneurs starting out for 
instance help with writing a business plan. Support can be requested from PES in the first 
three years that a company exists, yet may also be granted later on if the facilities were 
already necessary at the start of the company and if these are related to the disability. 
Complementary services are the starter credit (starterskrediet) and the preparation 
credit (voorbereidingskrediet). The starter credit is a facility to support starting 
entrepreneurs who are denied credit by a bank. Via the starter credit the entrepreneur 
may still get finances. There are two ways of obtaining such credit. First, PES could act as 
guarantor for a loan from a commercial bank. Second, PES could lend the money to the 
new entrepreneur. This latter option may be taken if a commercial bank does not give a 
loan even though PES is willing to vouch for the entrepreneur. The interest for this loan is 
8 %. The condition is that the enterprise matches the capacities and past work experience 
of the new entrepreneur (UWV, 2013). Moreover, the illness or handicap should have lasted 
(likely) at least one year and the starter credit is necessary to get back to work. Also non-
benefit receivers may qualify for this. Moreover, the business plan should entail the goals 
of the company. In addition, the entrepreneur should live in the Netherlands and the start-
up company be located in the Netherlands. However, at times it is possible to receive a 
starter credit within the border region with Belgium or Germany. 
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The preparation credit may be used to prepare for a start-up, including visiting professional 
conferences, buying literature or acquiring customers. This credit is not provided as a sum 
of money, but rather consists of PES paying back expenses that have been made. The 
request for the preparation credit should be accompanied by a business plan, entailing 
prognoses of profits and an estimation of the amount of credit needed (UWV, 2013). 
Start-up incentive for welfare recipients 
The Decision on welfare provision for entrepreneurs (Besluit bijstandverlening 
zelfstandigen - Bbz)2 arranges among other incentives for the target group of welfare 
recipients to start-up their own business. Welfare recipients get one year to prepare for 
the start-up while keeping their benefits (Rijksoverheid, 2014). In the preparatory phase 
people can for instance write a business plan. They may also apply for a non-interest 
bearing loan in order to pay for preparations. After that, the municipality (which provides 
social assistance and guidance) judges whether or not the ideas amount to a viable 
company. As soon as the company starts, welfare ends. Yet, the municipality may give the 
new entrepreneur a starter credit in company capital (see e.g. Article 39 Bbz). This is a 
maximum interest-bearing loan of EUR 35 130. Regarding the amount of public 
resources and sources, the central government gives municipalities a budget for their 
welfare activities, both the passive and active aspects of welfare provisions. The Dutch 
budgets of 2013 and 2014 show that the expenditure for the Bbz part providing income 
support to starting entrepreneurs is structurally around EUR 28.5 million per year 
(Rijksbegroting, 2014). 
Regarding evaluation and monitoring, the general Act Work and Welfare has a section 
on the requirement to evaluate the Act four years after its implementation in 2004 (Wet 
Werk en Bijstand, Article 84). There is no specific Article on evaluating the Bbz, but the 
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs did give the assignment to evaluate this 
particular start-up incentive. In 2011, the Bbz was evaluated using quantitative data from 
Statistics Netherlands, interviews with 28 stakeholders involved in the implementation, 
analysis of municipality policy documents, and telephone surveys among starters and pre-
starters. The first finding of the evaluation is that 42 % of all Bbz starters find a sustainable 
source of income in managing their own company within 12 months after the start of the 
business. As a consequence, the Bbz increases the sustainable outflow from social security 
from 56 % to 74 % (if the Bbz group is compared with a constructed control group). 
Second, the Bbz has a positive effect on entrepreneurship because welfare recipients are 
less likely to have started a company without the Bbz. Concerning sustainability of the 
start-up company, the evaluation shows that after four years, 49 % of Bbz start-ups are 
still in business, whereas 41 % of the regular starters (i.e. non-welfare recipients) still run 
the company they set up four years before (these are however two groups that do not 
necessarily share similar characteristics or incentives). Third, in terms of finances, the Bbz 
also has a positive effect. Compared to payment of welfare without re-integration into (self-
) employment, the Bbz saves the municipalities on average EUR 18 900 per starter over a 
24-year period, according to Ecorys. Yet, this calculation is of course based on many 
assumptions. The positive financial outcome stands despite increased costs due to 
preparations, guidance, continued payment of welfare in the start-up phase, etc. The 
overall conclusion is that the Bbz has positive effects on stimulating entrepreneurship and 
sustainable outflow from welfare. The beneficial effect of the Bbz could be even greater if 
a more active approach is followed (e.g. selection before proceeding to the next step in 
the programme, review of earnings trend after the start) in implementing the Bbz (Ecorys, 
2011).  
Other arrangements 
In general, there is (partial) social assistance possible for entrepreneurs who do not 
generate a minimum income from their business activities, provided for via the Decision 
                                           
2 Internet: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/bijstand-voor-zelfstandigen-bbz 
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on welfare provision for entrepreneurs (Besluit bijstandverlening zelfstandigen - Bbz)3. The 
different arrangements falling within the scope of Bbz are thus not only accessible to 
entrepreneurs who start-up a business from receiving benefits, yet are also there to 
support entrepreneurs whose income has dropped below welfare levels. The target 
groups are then entrepreneurs in financial hardship who wish to end their company and 
older entrepreneurs (aged over 55) with a company that is not viable. In practice, such 
entrepreneurs are often self-employed without personnel (see e.g. Article 2 Bbz). The 
condition is that the entrepreneur is at least 18 years old. Income will be supplemented 
to reach the welfare level, yet the provision is means-tested and takes account of the 
income of a household (including the income of a spouse). 
Loaning company capital for starting entrepreneurs, 2014 
You are an: 
Type of company 
capital 
If the company 
capital is a gift 
If the company 




with a non-viable 
business 
A loan or a gift 
depending on the 
assets of the person 
involved 
Up to a maximum of 
EUR 9 541 if the assets 
of the person are less 
than  EUR 128 547  
Up to a maximum of 
EUR 9 541 if the 
assets of the person 






A loan or a gift. If the 
company capital is a 
gift, it is impossible to 
make use of the 
interest-bearing loan 
Maximum of EUR 9 541 
if the assets of a person 
are less than EUR 183 
683 and the income is 
below welfare levels 
Maximum of EUR 
190 812 to be paid 
back within 10 
years.  
Source: Internet: www.rijksoverheid.nl (Dutch government website) 
CASE STUDY BOX 
Country: Netherlands 
Measure title: Decision on welfare provision for entrepreneurs (Bbz) 
Main aims: Providing incentives and support to welfare recipients who want to set up 
their own business 
Short description of the initiative: This incentive has been implemented since 2004 
and is a permanent provision for welfare recipients who want to become an entrepreneur. 
In addition, the arrangement is also open to entrepreneurs whose income suddenly drops 
below the level of welfare. The welfare recipients get one year to prepare for the start-up 
while keeping their benefits. It gives them time to write a business plan, and non-interest 
bearing loans are available to pay for preparations. The municipality judges whether or 
not the ideas amount to a viable company. As soon as the company starts, welfare ends. 
Yet, the municipality may give the new entrepreneur a starter credit in company capital.  
Target group (who are the recipients of the start-up subsidy): welfare recipients 
Target enterprises: Not specified 
Eligibility conditions: Not specified 
                                           
3 Internet: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/bijstand-voor-zelfstandigen-bbz 
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Budget for the measure / share of EU funding: Central government allocates budget 
to municipalities. EUR 28.5 million annually. Yet, the municipality should pay it from a 
wider participation/activation budget. 
Accompanying measures (e.g. support with business plan, training, income support or 
other):  
Summary of evaluation findings: An evaluation shows that Bbz has positive effects on 
stimulating entrepreneurship and sustainable outflow from welfare. Although the number 
of people who make use of the arrangement is relatively low (around 1 500 per year), it 
is an important result for a group that often faces severe obstacles in entering the labour 
market. Moreover, the arrangement seems to be cost-effective. In addition, there might 
even be ways to improve the effectiveness of the arrangement. 
Policy lessons: Relatively cost-effective measure that provides support for some of the 
groups who often face severe obstacles when flowing to the labour market. 
References (including weblinks to published evaluation studies): Ecorys (2011), Bbz 
2004: uit het startblok. Eindrapport [Bbz 2004 evaluation final report], Rotterdam: 
Ecorys. Internet:  http://www.ecorys.nl/contents/uploads/factsheets/43_1.pdf  
3 Conclusion 
The three different types of start-up incentives for unemployed and inactive in the 
Netherlands are interesting because they are relatively cost-effective, and in some cases 
enable people with difficulties entering the labour market to leave benefits. The incentive 
for jobseekers is obtaining a period where there is no obligation to apply for a job. Instead, 
the new entrepreneur may spend his or her time preparing for a business start-up. For 
people receiving UB this is accompanied with a lower UB income, while those on disability 
or sickness benefits, or people on welfare, are only confronted with a decrease or 
termination of their benefits after the start of the enterprise. All types of benefits recipients 
that have been addressed in this article receive coaching and support while setting up their 
business. This mostly has a positive influence on the future entrepreneur, as partners may 
improve the business plan and thus enhance future prospects of the start-up. In addition, 
people who have a work disability may receive some aid in getting specific equipment or 
support which will help them start-up their business in spite of their disabilities. Even 
though the incentives for start-ups do not lead to spectacular outflow from benefits, the 
cost-effectiveness of the measures make them nevertheless interesting examples. It 
seems that those who really want to become an entrepreneur, or those who have little 
prospects of flowing into a regular job, can try out entrepreneurship, while getting enough 
support and keeping a good level of income support for the first -and often tricky- period 
of becoming an entrepreneur. 
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